UNITED
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GENERAL

S/1994/169
14 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

MID-TERM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY LIAISON TEAM IN CAMBODIA

1. The United Nations Military Liaison Team was established by Security Council resolution 880 (1993) of 4 November 1993, following a request by the two Co-Prime Ministers of Cambodia. Resolution 880 (1993) mandates the Military Liaison Team to "report on matters affecting security in Cambodia, to maintain liaison with the Government of Cambodia and to assist the Government in dealing with residual matters relating to the Paris Agreements". The purpose of the present report is to inform the Security Council of the Team's activities, and apprise it of the security situation prevailing in Cambodia for the period 15 November 1993 to 31 January 1994.

2. The 20-member United Nations Military Liaison Team was established in Phnom Penh on 15 November 1993 for a period of six months, following the withdrawal of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The mandate of the Military Liaison Team will expire on 15 May 1994. The members of the Team are drawn from the following countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, China, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Thailand and Uruguay. The Chief Military Liaison Officer is Colonel Muniruz Zaman (Bangladesh). Administrative support is provided by two international staff.

3. The Military Liaison Team has established extensive liaison with the relevant Cambodian government ministries and has kept close contact with other United Nations agencies, embassies of Governments represented in Cambodia and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

4. During the reporting period, hostilities have continued between the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) and the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK). Fighting has occurred mainly in the north-western areas of Anlong Veng and Preah Vihear, along the border with Thailand and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. According to an official government statement, there have been approximately 3,000 defectors from NADK to the government side to date.

5. At the same time, efforts have taken place to arrive at a political settlement. The First Prime Minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, met twice with Mr. Khieu Samphan, the head of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), to discuss the issue of integration of NADK into the mainstream political establishment. The first meeting took place on mid-December 1993 in Bangkok, Thailand, where Prince Ranariddh presented to Mr. Khieu Samphan a three-point

proposal for a political settlement in return for a cease-fire, withdrawal of NADK forces from NADK-held territory and integration of the NADK armed forces into RCAF. Prince Ranariddh has stated that the Government would consider amending the Constitution to include the leaders of NADK in the Government if NADK agreed to abide by the conditions laid down. A second meeting was held in Thailand in early January 1994. The Government feels strongly that NADK will have to agree to a cease-fire before serious discussions can take place, while NADK has stated that it will continue fighting until a suitable framework for political participation is established.

6. Allegations that NADK was receiving support from Thai territory caused concern during the reporting period. In mid-January, the Prime Minister of Thailand, Mr. Chuan Leekpai, visited Cambodia and both Governments affirmed on that occasion their determination to strengthen bilateral ties based on mutual benefit and respect for their independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. They agreed to establish a joint commission for bilateral cooperation and a separate joint committee on the demarcation of international borders.

7. There have been incidents of violence against ethnic Vietnamese for which NADK is reported to have been responsible. The Government is in the process of formulating immigration laws that will pertain to the ethnic Vietnamese minority population in Cambodia.

8. The Military Liaison Team has followed the integration of factional forces into RCAF as a residual issue under the Paris Agreements. This process is under way at all levels of command, from the Ministry of Defence to units in the field. RCAF is putting emphasis on the training of officers and soldiers in the field. With effect from February 1994, a three- to six-month general staff course is proposed for high-ranking army officers. RCAF has reported that it has completed the restructuring of its forces and that the Ministry of Defence and General Staff have been restructured. Disciplinary problems have been reported in some units, which are mostly attributed to low morale resulting from non-payment of salaries and the lack of basic amenities and supplies. There has been a drive to eliminate previous factional identities through such efforts as the standardization of military uniforms. Defence cooperation and aid are being sought from other countries with a view to modernizing and enhancing the operational efficiency of RCAF.

9. Internal security in Cambodia has become more precarious following the withdrawal of the military component of UNTAC. The depressed state of the economy continues and the prolonged non-payment of salaries to civil servants, including soldiers of RCAF, and the widespread availability of weapons have aggravated the situation. Many illegal checkpoints are reported to have been set up throughout the countryside by RCAF soldiers and others, who extort money from travellers. A large number of thefts and armed robberies have been reported and banditry is widespread. Several vehicles and office equipment belonging to the Military Liaison Team have been stolen, often at gunpoint. However, government departments that are responsible for the maintenance of law and order are being strengthened and Cambodia has entered into bilateral agreements with other countries in support of these efforts.

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14 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, I have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation to His Excellency Mr. Mohammad Peyrovi, Ambassador, Deputy Permament Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to the United Nations, to address the Council under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure in the course of the Council's consideration of the item "The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina".

(Signed) Sher Afgan KHAN
Acting Permanent Representative

94-07788 (E) 140294 150294

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S/1994/171
14 February 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 11 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a table showing detonations of the 458 miscellaneous bombs, shells and missiles left behind by the 30-Power aggression against Iraq and found and disposed of in all parts of the country between 1 and 31 January 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Table 2

No.	Civil Defence Department	Number and type of ordnance found
1	Ninawa	(a) 9 BLU-97 cluster bombs (b) 55 spherical bombs (c) 36 120-mm artillery shells (d) 3 60-mm artillery shells (e) 1 defensive hand-grenade (f) 6 hand-grenade detonators
2	Maysan	(a) 4 cluster bombs (b) 5 helicopter missiles (c) 36 launcher rockets (d) 43 mortar shells of various calibre
3	Anbar	1 launcher rocket
4	Ta'mim	(a) 15 rockets (b) 15 mortar shells
5	Diyala	5 60-mm mortar shells
6	Dhi Qar	(a) 1 Strela missile (b) 1 launcher rocket
7	Najaf	2 launcher rockets
8	Basra	(a) 95 82-mm mortar shells (b) 82 120-mm artillery shells (c) 17 cluster bombs (d) 10 propellant charges (e) 14 launcher rockets
9	Salah al-Din	1 spherical bomb
10	Babil	1 120-mm mortar shell

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 167
BUILDING A PEACEFUL AND BETTER
WORLD THROUGH SPORT

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 14 February 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit a statement, received by fax, made by the Press Service of the Ministry of Defence of the Azerbaijani Republic in connection with the appeal by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to the States and parties engaged in armed conflict to declare a truce for the duration of the 1994 Winter Olympics being held in Lillehammer (Norway) from 12 to 25 February.

I should also like to draw to your attention the fact that in response to Azerbaijan's readiness to cease fire on the day of the opening of the Olympic Games, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia launched a large-scale attack along the entire breadth of the front. The Armenian troops, introducing new, fresh forces from Armenian territory into the Kelbajar district of Azerbaijan, are attempting to break through to the main body of the Armenian occupation force. Fierce, bloody engagements are continuing in this direction.

Continuous positional engagements are also taking place in the Fizuli district of Azerbaijan

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its attachment circulated as a document of the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session, under agenda item 167, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yashar T. ALIYEV
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

ANNEX

Statement by the Press Service of the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan dated 11 February 1994

In connection with the appeal by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to States and parties engaged in armed conflicts to declare a truce for the duration of the 1994 Winter Olympics being held in Lillehammer (Norway) from 12 to 25 February, the Press Service of the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan is authorized by the Command of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan to state the following.

The Azerbaijani Republic, as a member of the international community and of IOC, acknowledges and respects the long-standing principle of halting wars for the period of the Olympic Games. On the assumption that this step may have a positive impact on the reduction of tension and the future settlement of the conflict, Azerbaijan's armed forces are prepared to support the act of goodwill proposed by IOC and to cease fire forever across the whole breadth of the front, if the armed forces of Armenia withdraw their occupying forces from the Azerbaijani territory captured by them.

This reservation, the Command of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan explains, is necessary because in the past the Armenian side has more than once taken advantage of a cease-fire to deliver an attack and capture Azerbaijani territory, and there is no guarantee that the same thing will not happen this time.

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S/1994/173
14 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached report addressed to me on 12 February 1994 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

94-07812 (E) 140294 150294

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Annex

Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

INTRODUCTION

1. In their previous report (S/1994/64), the Co-Chairmen dealt with the round of peace talks held in Geneva from 18 to 19 January. On that occasion, a map proposed by the Bosnian Serbs had been on the table offering the Muslim majority republic 33.56%, and the Republic of Croatia had stated its willingness to sign linked agreements providing the Muslim majority republic with 99-year leases for use of a port at Ploce, a port on the Neretva River at Celevo from which seagoing cargo boats or tourist passenger boats could link up with their facilities in Ploce or the existing small port on the Peljesac peninsula.

2. President Izetbegovic had acknowledged that the Muslim majority republic was being offered 33.56%. He had submitted, however, that the map should be altered so as to include in the territory allocated to the Muslim majority republic certain areas in eastern and western Bosnia where the Muslims had been in the majority before the outbreak of the conflict, as well as certain areas in central Bosnia, while keeping within the target of 33.3%.

3. Since the parties had agreed on all other aspects of a peace package other than some areas of territory in respect of which there were competing claims, the Co-Chairmen had submitted to the parties the idea that the areas in question should be referred to an arbitration commission appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice after consultation with the parties. The recommendations of the Commission would be addressed, in the first instance, to the parties and, only if there was disagreement, the matter would be referred to the Security Council.

4. The Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs had expressed their willingness to accept these procedures. The Bosnian Presidency had taken the position that military forces should be withdrawn from the areas in question before an arbitration procedure could be accepted.

5. In those circumstances, and faced with the danger of renewed and intensified conflict, the Co-Chairmen had proposed that the parties establish hot-lines, that they exchange representatives in one another's headquarters in Sarajevo, Mostar and Pale, and that the parties should meet again in Geneva on 10 February 1994 to consider the effectiveness of those arrangements and other practical confidence-building measures to reduce the level of fighting.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

6. In accordance with the decision taken by the parties on 19 January, a working group coordinated by Brigadier-General Bo Pellnäs held two meetings in Sarajevo on 25 January and on 5 February. All three Bosnian parties took part. The Bosnian Presidency delegation was led by Prime Minister H. Silajdzic, the Bosnian Croat delegation by Mr. M. Akmadzic, and the Bosnian Serb delegation by Professor N. Koljevic. Observers of UNPROFOR, UNHCR AND ICRC also took part.

7. On 25 January, an agreement was signed among the three parties providing for the restoration of the electricity system. The parties agreed to the principle of joint cooperation for the immediate repair of the electricity system. They solemnly promised that their respective forces would not, after the signing of the agreement, destroy any aspect or facility of the electricity system, nor would they prevent any work conducted by repair and maintenance teams. Additionally, the forces of the parties would not in any way interfere with or withhold the provision of electricity to any of the other parties. The agreement called for the immediate restoration of electricity lines or systems in six areas.

8. Other items on the agenda of the Working Group included the establishment of hot-lines; the establishment of standing liaison teams; regular meetings between Commanders; and Joint Military Commissions. On the issue of hot-lines, it was reported that lines of communications already existed between the BiH Army and HVO as well as between HVO and the BSA. The Bosnian Serbs accepted to establish communications with the BiH Army, and UNPROFOR was asked to follow up on this subject and to facilitate the necessary arrangements.

SARAJEVO

9. During a meeting with Dr. Karadzic in Pale on 5 February, General Pellnäs received an assurance from the Bosnian Serbs that they were ready to agree to United Nations administration of, and the demilitarization of, Sarajevo District as defined in the peace plan under discussion in Geneva in advance of a final settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This important development was about to be discussed that same day in the confidence-building meeting at Sarajevo Airport when a shell landed in the market place of Sarajevo and the meeting had to be suspended. In view of this political development concerning Sarajevo, which the Co-Chairmen had first put to the Bosnia Serbs in Geneva on 19 January, and in the light of that day's tragedy, the Co-Chairmen took action to follow up urgently the implementation of a separate political and military peace agreement involving Sarajevo District as the first step to an overall peace settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

10. On 6 February, the Co-Chairmen travelled to Zvornik, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to follow up this development with the Bosnian Serbs. After five hours of discussion with Bosnian Serb leaders, including Dr. Karadzic, the following agreement was reached with them:

> "In order to bring peace to Sarajevo now, the Bosnian Serbs are ready, in the circumstances where it is not yet possible to reach an overall peace settlement, to negotiate for United Nations administration and the demilitarization of Sarajevo District prior to a final settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The details can be discussed as part of the meeting in Geneva on 10 February on confidence-building measures with a view to establishing a mixed military-political Joint Commission to meet at Sarajevo airport."

TALKS IN GENEVA, 10-12 FEBRUARY

11. Representatives of the Bosnian Presidency, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs, together with Observers from the Governments of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), met in Geneva from 10 to 12 February to review the above developments and to continue the search for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Presidency delegation was led by Prime Minister H. Silajdzic, the Bosnian Croat delegation by Mr. M. Akmadzic and the Bosnian Serb delegation by Dr. R. Karadzic. Deputy Foreign Minister V. Churkin and Ambassador C. Redman attended as Observers.

12. Plenary as well as bilateral meetings were held. At the first plenary meeting, the Co-Chairmen invited the parties to review further confidence-building measures, bearing in mind the agreement that had been reached in Sarajevo on 9 February between the representatives of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army, meeting under the auspices of General Rose, the UNPROFOR (BH) Commander. That agreement provided

> "... that there should be an immediate ceasefire in and around the city (as from 1200A 10 February 1994), that there should be a positioning of UNPROFOR troops in sensitive areas and key locations, and that there should be the monitoring and placing of all heavy weapons under UNPROFOR control."

The Co-Chairmen emphasized upon all concerned the importance of their respecting their commitments, and urged them, in the strongest possible terms, to help defuse the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to set a course for the re-establishment of peace.

13. Noting that the two meetings on confidence-building had been held at a high level and conducted in a positive and constructive manner, the Co-Chairmen encouraged the Bosnian parties to regularize those meetings and to meet at fixed intervals. The parties undertook to do so.

14. The Co-Chairmen then invited the Bosnian parties to review the outstanding areas holding up the signature of a peace agreement. Bilateral meetings were held between the delegations of the Bosnian Presidency and the Bosnian Croats, the delegations of the Bosnian Presidency and the Bosnian Serbs, and the delegations of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. After these bilateral meetings, a plenary meeting was held to review the results of the bilateral meetings.

15. As the final plenary meeting on 12 February, the Co-Chairmen summarized the results of the discussions. They noted that on future constitutional arrangements, all three sides had expressly reiterated their acceptance of a Union of Republics, consisting of a Croat majority republic, a Muslim majority republic and a Serb majority republic.

16. The Bosnian Presidency and the Bosnian Croats reiterated their agreement that Mostar would be placed under the administration of the European Union. The Bosnian Presidency and the Bosnian Serbs reiterated their acceptance that Sarajevo would be placed under the administration of the United Nations. It was agreed that during the period of European Union administration of Mostar and United Nations administration of Sarajevo final territorial delimitations would be worked out.

17. With regard to the definition of the Mostar City area to be placed under the administration of the European Union, the Bosnian Presidency and the Bosnian Croats agreed that the Working Group which had been established in Brussels on 23 December to look into this issue should meet on 16 February in Medjugorje, at the Headquarters of the Spanish Battalion.

18. In respect of Sarajevo, the Co-Chairmen invited the Bosnian Presidency and the Bosnian Serbs to consider the possibility of concluding a separate agreement on Sarajevo in advance of an overall peace agreement. The Bosnian Serbs indicated their readiness to negotiate such a separate agreement. The Bosnian Presidency, however, said that while it was willing to pursue discussions on Sarajevo, there would be no such discussions until Serb withdrawal of heavy weapons was complete, and that any agreement worked out should be part of the overall peace settlement.

19. The Co-Chairmen tried a number of avenues to get the parties to move towards agreement on the territories still under dispute. They first invited the parties to indicate whether the number of disputed areas could be reduced. This did not prove possible and indeed the parties began to suggest additions to the list of disputed areas. The Co-Chairmen then invited the parties to consider whether it might be possible to move to a peace agreement by arranging for some of the areas to be treated as protected areas, while a few of them could be placed under international administration. These possibilities were kept open, but discussion of them was affected by the Bosnian Serbs' contention that the Bosnian Presidency, having agreed to 33.3%, was trying to pocket the 33.56% already offered and still to maintain a list of disputed areas. A similar contention was put forward by the Bosnian Croats who also asked for recognition that they should have 17.5% of territory. The Bosnian Presidency, however, maintained its claims. It added that it could only accept the Croats having 17.5% on the condition that it was not prejudicial to the Presidency's claims.

20. The Co-Chairmen again consulted the parties on the proposed arbitration procedure. All three sides said that they accepted the concept of arbitration, but the Bosnian Presidency maintained its position that before an arbitration procedure could be used there should be withdrawal of military forces from the areas in question. The Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs accepted that there needed to be a withdrawal of forces, accompanied by the insertion of United

Nations civilian police, in order to encourage people who lived there before the war to return, but that the areas had to be within the provisional boundaries of the republics. The Bosnian Presidency maintained that the disputed areas could not be considered as falling within the provisional republican boundaries.

21. The Co-Chairmen consulted the parties on other possible avenues for overcoming the hurdle over the disputed territories. Among the possibilities mentioned was the establishment of an International Joint Control Commission whose tasks would be to ensure that nothing was done in any of the disputed areas to alter their character or status, or which could be prejudicial to their eventual allocation while the arbitration procedure functioned. Another possibility mentioned was referral of the disputed areas to the Security Council or to a group of members of the Council. The parties were asked to suggest other possible procedures for reaching agrement on the outstanding territorial issues. No such suggestion was forthcoming.

22. In the circumstances, it was agreed that the parties should consult bilaterally, and should also have discussions with the special envoys of the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In the light of those further consultations, the Co-Chairmen would assess the situation with a view to inviting the parties back to Geneva for further talks towards the end of February or the beginning of March.

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LETTER DATED 15 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, I have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation to H.E. Mr. Ahmet Engin Ansay, Permanent Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to the United Nations, to address the Council under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure in the course of the Council's consideration of the item "The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina".

(Signed) Sher Afgan KHAN
Acting Permanent Representative

94-07880 (E) 150294

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S/1994/175
15 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARMENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a statement issued on 11 February 1994 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nagorny Karabakh.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the statement as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alexander ARZOUMANIAN
Permanent Representative

Annex

The authorities of the Azerbaijani Republic have adopted an aggressive and uncompromising position in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, relying conclusively on a military solution to the conflict. To achieve its goals, the Azerbaijani Government has availed itself of all possible means, including those which contradict international law.

Since the beginning of the conflict in the region, the Baku authorities, utilizing various excuses, have obstructed the attempts of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit Armenian prisoners-of-war detained under inhumane conditions in Azerbaijani prisons and camps. Under international law, it is the obligation of all countries that detain such prisoners to permit visits by ICRC. Azerbaijan's cynical dismissal of this obligation once again testifies to its attitude towards the internationally accepted norms of the civilized world.

Additionally, other outright violations of the norms of the Geneva Conventions have also become evident. Specifically, Armenian prisoners brought in from the conflict zone have been displayed on Baku television and before the representatives of foreign diplomatic missions in Azerbaijan. There is no doubt that the testimony obtained from these prisoners was taken under duress and torture.

While condemning the immoral activities of the authorities of Azerbaijan, which stand in violation of basic human rights, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nagorny Karabakh expresses its astonishment with regard to the participation of foreign diplomats in the display of the political prisoners.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nagorny Karabakh calls the attention of the international community to the above-mentioned facts and appeals to them to spare no effort to prevent the persecution of the prisoners by the Baku authorities, and to take measures to admonish those who are responsible.

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15 February 1994
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LETTER DATED 14 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, at 1310 hours on 14 February 1994, United States and allied aircraft broke the sound barrier over residential quarters in Muthanna Governorate, causing the smashing of glass in windows and doors in large numbers of citizens' homes and official offices in the Governorate and arousing alarm and panic among women, children and the elderly.

The continued breaking of the sound barrier by United States and allied aggressor aircraft provides ongoing proof of the insistence of the United States of America on inflicting injury on Iraq and its people and prejudicing its security and sovereignty.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq protests strongly at the continuation of these hostile acts and requests you to intervene and to take such steps as are imposed by the Charter of the international Organization to halt these acts and prevent their recurrence in the future.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-07972 (E) 160294 160294

160294

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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S/1994/177
16 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon subsequent instructions of my Government, I have the honour to kindly request that the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, Mr. Mate Granic, addressed to you, dated 11 February 1994 and submitted to your office on the same date, now be distributed as a document of the Security Council.

A copy of the letter in question is attached for your reference.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 11 February 1994 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Croatia to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that significant progress was achieved during the talks between Mr. Haris Silajdžić and myself in Geneva on 9 and 10 February 1994.

In our joint statement, both sides agreed to continue and intensify their talks and specifically:

(a) Separately to renew their appeal to the Security Council and request that international control be established along all the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of achieving a peaceful solution;

(b) That the military commanders of the two sides meet within the next seven days in order to work out the remaining details concerning the overall cease-fire;

(c) That negotiations on the unconditional exchange of detainees will be speeded up and that both sides will further cooperate in the search for missing persons;

(d) That deliberations and negotiations about all possible modalities of the future relations between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, as well as between the two States, will be continued, taking into consideration the principles and arrangements already agreed upon;

(e) That future political solutions notwithstanding, both sides should secure the return of refugees to their homes following the restoration of peace.

As regards point (a) of the joint statement, the Government of Croatia would like to reiterate its position concerning control of its internationally recognized borders, the borders with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and, in particular, control of its borders with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Republic of Croatia maintains its firm opinion that strict adherence to Security Council resolution 769 (1992) is essential for the implementation of the mandate of the peace-keeping forces in Croatia, as it is for the implementation of resolutions 757 (1992) and 787 (1992) and, in particular, resolution 820 (1993).

Similarly, my Government believes that complete and effective control of all the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is of equal importance and would strengthen the possibility for a peaceful solution to the conflict along the lines of the European Union action plan. In this regard, the implementation of Security Council resolutions 787 (1992), in particular paragraph 16, and 838 (1993) is crucial.

The Republic of Croatia has, on several occasions, specifically in documents S/25766, S/25885 and in particular S/25874, requested that international observers be positioned entirely on its territory in order to monitor the border of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. My Government firmly reiterates that position.

However, fully aware of the considerable financial and personnel strains resulting from the possible use of numerous ground troops, as suggested in the report of the Secretary-General (S/26018 and Add.1), my Government would instead propose the use, with the authorization of the Security Council, of the aerial surveillance and air power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which could be undertaken by appropriately equipped aircraft of the Member States already implementing Security Council resolution 816 (1993).

Pursuing the full normalization of Muslim-Croat relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the betterment of cooperation between the two neighbouring States, in accordance with the initiative presented by the President of the Republic of Croatia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, in Bonn on 10 January 1994, my Government further proposes that a special team of international inspectors undertake an in-depth inquiry and establish the true facts concerning the alleged presence of foreign elements in various military formations engaged in operations in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As a peace-promoting step in cooperation with the Security Council and as a goodwill gesture towards the Sarajevo Government, in the meantime my Government expresses its readiness to withdraw certain units from the border areas with Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with the recent Security Council request. But my Government also calls upon the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately to order its army to cease all hostilities and offensive actions against Croatian population centres, especially in the region of central Bosnia. Following the cessation of hostilities, we shall issue an appeal to all Croat volunteers in central Bosnia to lay down their arms and return to their normal civilian lives.

The Republic of Croatia is ready to call off the units of the Croatian Army on the left bank of the Neretva River and elements of the Croatian Army on the right bank of the Neretva. The Republic of Croatia would approach the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and the UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina to agree on the monitoring mechanism that would verify strict compliance with the Security Council request. We would propose to the UNPROFOR representatives that withdrawal be completed by 15 February 1994.

Furthermore, as a measure aimed at easing the tensions in the area, the Government of the Republic of Croatia would advise the command of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) to withdraw a part of its heavy weaponry in central Bosnia and to declare a cease-fire in the town of Mostar unilaterally.

My Government hopes that the continuation of constructive negotiations between the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim sides and the implementation of the agreed cease-fire will create conditions conducive to the further easing of

military tensions between the two sides, pending the search for an overall political solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In order to make this appeal truly effective and to contribute further to the return to normalcy in the area, as well as to prevent even greater suffering of the Croatian civilians and the new wave of refugees, my Government demands once again that the Security Council provide firm guarantees for the safety of the four remaining Croatian enclaves in central Bosnia (Vitez, Novi Travnik, Usora and Žepče) subjected to the ongoing offensive of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Government of the Republic of Croatia reiterates its strong support for the European Union action plan of 22 November 1993. At the same time my Government welcomes the consensus that was finally achieved among European countries, the United States of America and other Members of the United Nations to continue to work along those lines in order to reach a peaceful and comprehensive settlement to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, it also welcomes the readiness to use NATO forces, if necessary, to end the long suffering of the civilians in the besieged city of Sarajevo.

The Republic of Croatia believes that the Security Council has to continue to play a decisive role in finding a lasting and comprehensive solution to the crisis in accordance with all previous Security Council resolutions.

(Signed) Mate GRANIĆ
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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S/1994/178
16 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE AND ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 15 February 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to the United Nations stating that Mr. Dušan Rovenský has been appointed deputy representative of the Czech Republic on the Security Council and Mr. Miroslav Tůma alternate representative.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is the second in a series of reports on the activities of the Electoral Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) that I intend to submit to the Security Council until the elections scheduled for 20 March 1994 are held. My previous report (S/26606) was issued on 20 October 1993.

2. The activities of the Electoral Division during the period from November 1993 to January 1994 have focused on observing voter registration, which was closed on 20 November 1993, monitoring the election campaign and providing assistance in the drawing up of an electoral roll, in keeping with the appeal made by the Security Council on 5 November 1993 (S/26695). The Electoral Division holds regular joint meetings with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Board of Vigilance, which is made up of representatives of all political parties, and the party campaign managers with a view to solving any problems that may arise during the campaign. In order to monitor the campaign, the Division is asking the parties to provide a schedule of their campaign activities. In addition, a system has been set up to receive and process allegations of violations of the Electoral Code. These allegations are transmitted in writing to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, which is asked to report on the follow-up action taken. The Division has already prepared a plan for the reception and deployment of the international observers who, working with current Mission staff, and thus bringing the total number to 900, are to monitor the events on election day. In the area of foreign affairs, the Division has met with more than 60 delegations from embassies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and universities, as well as numerous researchers and journalists seeking information about the electoral process.

I. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ELECTION

3. On 20 March 1994, 4 elections will be held simultaneously in El Salvador: elections for President, with a second round if no candidate obtains an absolute majority in the first round; parliamentary elections for the 84 seats in the

National Assembly on the basis of proportional representation; municipal elections in 262 mayoral districts on the basis of a simple majority (the party obtaining the most votes will win the office of mayor and all the posts in the municipal corporation); and for the Central American Parliament, to which 20 deputies will be elected on the basis of proportional representation.

4. Six parties and one coalition have registered to run in the presidential election, headed by the following candidates: Armando Calderón Sol for the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA); Fidel Chávez Mena for the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC); Rubén Zamora for the coalition composed of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), the Convergencia Democrática (CD) and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN); Edgardo Rodríguez for the Movimiento de Solidaridad Nacional (MSN); Jorge Martínez for the Movimiento de Unidad (MU); Rina de Rey Prendes for the Movimiento Auténtico Cristiano (MAC); and Roberto Escobar García for the Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN). The number of parties running in the elections for the National Assembly and municipal councils was reduced to nine following the merging of the Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano (MPSC), the Partido Social Demócrata (PSD) and the Unión Democrática Nacionalista (UDN) into a single party called Convergencia Democrática and the failure of the Pueblo Libre (PL) party to put forward any candidates.

5. In the Legislative Assembly elections, the parties are running in all departments without forming coalitions. In the municipal elections, the parties are most often running on their own, although the situation varies from region to region. In general, no coalition candidates are running in the cities, with the exception of San Salvador, where a coalition candidate has been put up by FMLN and MNR. In smaller towns, the most common coalition is FMLN/CD.

6. Recent months have seen a number of reforms in electoral legislation; generally speaking, these tend to be inclusive in nature, facilitating the participation both of political parties and of Salvadorian citizens. Mention should be made of the following measures: the deadline for the closure of voter registration was extended by one month to 19 January 1994, thereby facilitating the issuing of voter registration cards; the deadline for registering candidates for the office of Deputy and for the municipal councils was extended from 19 to 31 January 1994; and publishing the results of surveys or projections of possible voting outcome was prohibited during the period running from 15 days prior to the election until the final results are made public.

7. Lastly, a major reform of the Electoral Code succeeded in resolving the dispute between the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the parties comprising the MNR/CD/FMLN coalition with regard to the composition of the departmental and municipal election boards, a dispute caused by the Tribunal's decision to reduce the number of representatives of the coalition parties to one when the coalition was legally registered. ONUSAL voiced its concern publicly at the difficult situation thus created and asked that the problem be resolved by means of a broad interpretation of the law that would allow all parties running in the four elections to participate. The legislative reform of 19 January unequivocally calls for all parties registering candidates to be represented on the departmental and municipal election boards.

8. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the highest authority and the general overseer of the electoral process, has improved its organization, its management capacity and its ability to deal flexibly with problems that have arisen in recent months. In spite of the Tribunal's outdated computer equipment and initial problems of transport and communication, the work of registering voters and issuing voter registration documents has been achieved with technical and logistical support from ONUSAL and the contracting of private computing and photocopying companies. These companies also entered data in digital form from birth certificates that were collected to validate the maximum possible number of voter registration requests that had been rejected for want of a birth certificate.

9. Notwithstanding these improvements, the Tribunal has yet to have an office in the town of Concepción de Oriente and maintains a presence only sporadically in other small towns such as Nuevo Edén de San Juan and San Luis de la Reina. In eight towns in Chalatenango which had been involved in the conflict, the cameras used in processing voter registration cards were returned to the departmental seat, contrary to the Tribunal's plan. This violation was reported to the Tribunal, but the cameras have yet to be returned to the towns in question. There are still many towns in which the Tribunal office is closed over the weekend, preventing citizens from smaller towns and villages from obtaining their cards. Although this problem is related to the use of municipal facilities, which are closed on weekends, it is the Tribunal's responsibility to provide this service without interruption.

10. During the next five weeks, when hundreds of thousands of voter registration cards are to be issued, it is important that the Tribunal's offices remain open throughout the country seven days a week, as originally planned. The issuing of cards is being promoted by the holding of special weekend days similar to those organized for voter registration, with the participation of the Tribunal, municipal governments, ONUSAL and NGOs.

11. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal has not been able to meet the 30-day deadline for issuing registration cards or notifying individuals why they have not received them. Of the 40 alleged violations relating to the issuing of voter registration cards, 13 related to this fact. Now that special days for the issuing of registration cards are being held, the Tribunal, with the help of NGOs, has begun to reply within 10 days by telegram to those citizens who have not received cards even though they had filled out a request.

12. In December 1993, departmental election boards were set up; these are mid-level electoral authorities with important functions in the areas of election monitoring, reporting violations of electoral legislation, delivering all election material to the municipal boards and collecting ballots. All political parties taking part in the election are represented on both the departmental and the municipal boards. The composition of these boards reflects the multiparty nature of the electoral authority. The elected chairmen of the departmental electoral boards come from FMLN in 7 of the country's 14 departments; from PDC in 4 departments; from ARENA in 2 departments; and from MSN in 1. Although the Boards are formally established, they have scant resources with which to operate. As a result, during January 1994 ONUSAL

received numerous requests from the boards for resources from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

13. The Board of Vigilance, composed of representatives of all parties fielding candidates in the election, acquired its own facilities during December 1993 and now has its own computers. To support the work of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Board is helping to provide advisory services to citizens who encounter problems in obtaining voter registration cards. In addition, the Board of Vigilance and the political parties now possess copies of the electoral roll updated as of 19 January 1994, which replaces the previous list dating from May 1993.

14. An Electoral Counsel was appointed by the Attorney-General of the Republic in January 1994. The incumbent of this position, which is called for by law, is responsible for investigations and questions of amparo associated with the electoral process. However, as of the end of January an Auditor-General for Elections had yet to be appointed. The Auditor-General must be appointed by the Tribunal and is responsible for the administrative, financial and technical aspects of all legal matters pertaining to the electoral process. In both cases, the need for the appointment has been publicly stressed by certain opposition parties, particularly FMLN. With the appointment of the Auditor-General in the near future, the institutional structure of the electoral authority should be complete.

II. CLOSURE OF VOTER REGISTRATION

15. My report of October 1993 concluded with the hope that the authorities, the parties and other external institutions that are supporting the electoral process in El Salvador would collaborate and coordinate their activities with a realistic vision and offer constructive criticism that would facilitate the preparation of the electoral rolls, given that voter registration was a principal element in shaping the political atmosphere and the context of the election campaign. Following the closure of voter registration on 19 January 1994 and the drawing up of the provisional electoral rolls, major improvement in registration conditions has been observed. Here the work done by the Tribunal must be acknowledged, both in making its procedures more flexible and in remaining open to criticism and to suggestions from the Board of Vigilance, the political parties and the foreign agencies providing support for the electoral process. In addition, owing to the strategic and logistical support from the Electoral Division, with the help of the other components of ONUSAL, the joint efforts of various agencies and individuals resulted in a voter registration exercise that was more inclusive and free of flaws than might have been predicted a few months earlier.

16. During this period, the ONUSAL teams made an average of 6 observation visits to each of the country's 262 towns, or more than 1,700 visits. ONUSAL also provided support for the Tribunal plan during this period by dispatching some 2,500 mobile team visits, involving more than 5,000 trips by Mission staff. In the course of providing this support, some 297,000 kilometres of travel and roughly 180 hours of helicopter flying time were logged. ONUSAL put forward and

supported two plans for locating birth certificates in every town in the country so that requests for inclusion in the electoral rolls could be validated.

17. Quantitatively speaking, the registration exercise can be counted a success. With regard to the registration phase, when the deadline for submitting registration requests was reached on 19 November 1993, the outcome of the campaign launched by the Tribunal in July of that year was generally commended in political circles. The official figure of 787,834 registration requests reflects a high degree of citizen mobilization. Of the requests submitted between 1 July and 19 November 1993, some 469,098 were for new registrations, 85,560 were for changes and 229,800 were for reinstatement.

18. As for the number of actual registrations, when the electoral rolls were closed on 19 January 1994, the total stood at 2,653,871, of which 2,171,805 corresponded to voter registration cards issued in previous years and 482,066 for temporary cards that could be converted into permanent cards once they became available in the distribution centres and were claimed by the individuals concerned. By 19 January, voter registration cards had been issued to approximately 80 per cent of the estimated population of voting age. Once the temporary cards are converted into permanent cards, as many as 2.3 million Salvadorians may appear on the final electoral rolls and possess a registration card that will allow them to vote, according to projections made in September 1993 by the ONUSAL Electoral Division. This is equivalent to 85 per cent of the estimated voting-age population.

19. It should be borne in mind, however, that the electoral rolls will list approximately 2.7 million names. The discrepancy of 400,000 registrations between the Electoral Division's estimate of 2.3 million potential voters and the 2.7 million listed in the rolls, according to reliable estimates, may be ascribed to the following factors: (a) an indeterminate number of deceased persons holding voter registration cards may remain on the rolls, their definitive removal having been prevented by inadequacies in the system of death certificates; (b) at the same time, some 300,000 temporary cards issued in the field since 1991 that have been neither claimed nor converted into permanent cards may still exist, so that the individuals in whose names they were issued will remain on the rolls; and (c) an element that is the most difficult to quantify, is that there may be many Salvadorians still residing outside the country who, while possessing voter registration cards, are highly unlikely to return to the country to vote.

20. The various plans for locating birth certificates succeeded in obtaining certificates to validate some 60,000 requests for registration, with another 80,000 remaining invalid at the time registration was closed. It is probable that most of these requests would require a more detailed and time-consuming effort at validation owing to problems, inter alia, in identifying the place and date of birth and relating to the nature and order of names and surnames of the individuals concerned. El Salvador has no civil registry per se, and the relevant legislation affords great latitude in the use of surnames. These factors are compounded by distortions, both of a physical nature and in the identification of birth places, caused by migration from rural areas to towns and displacements caused by the armed conflict. One legal way of validating the requests that were rejected when registration was closed remains open, and the

citizens concerned may make use of it until 19 February 1994, when the final rolls are to be issued: articles 51 and 48 of the Electoral Code, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has upheld this in joint meetings with ONUSAL, the Board of Vigilance and donor organizations, permits any citizen whose name has not been included in the provisional rolls to submit a valid request accompanied by the corresponding birth certificate, whereupon he shall be included in the rolls.

21. With the closure of voter registration and the completion of work on the provisional electoral roll, certain difficulties persist that will have to be overcome if citizen participation is to proceed smoothly on election day. In the first place, it is necessary to ensure that all the temporary cards issued duly reach the Tribunal offices in the towns in which the voters have stated that they wish to vote, so that each of the voters goes to the expected site and no local community, however small, is faced with significant electoral gaps in its register. This last point is of particular importance in the municipal elections, where a small number of votes can decide the result of the election.

22. Secondly, citizens must verify that the information given on their card tallies exactly with the information included in the electoral roll. In accordance with article 30 of the Electoral Code, requests for corrections and adjustments to the provisional electoral roll may be legally submitted for up to 30 days before the election, until 19 February. This deadline was altered after the deadline for the closure of registration was legally changed to 60 days before the election. Some requests, for example those concerning the loss of a voter registration card, can be submitted even a few days before the election, as provided by article 48 of the Code. In practice, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has not included in its extensive instructions any specific directives on deadlines by which citizens are to submit various types of applications. ONUSAL has emphasized the need to provide unambiguous publicity where deadlines are concerned. Proper enforcement of the law requires that the Tribunal indicate the new deadlines for the implementation of articles 30 and 51 and determine the precise deadline for the implementation of article 48. If the provisional roll is to be corrected satisfactorily, not only the Tribunal but also the political parties and NGOs must be involved in helping the voters to verify whether the registration entry is correct and to submit the appropriate request.

23. Even when the final electoral roll is available on 19 February, some of the problems mentioned in my October 1993 report will persist and will have to be faced on election day by the electoral authorities at all levels and by the political party monitors and the international observers. For example, it will be impossible to determine the number of persons in possession of two or more voter registration cards, each with a different identity, obtained through the improper use of officially valid documentation. This situation is due to the legal framework within which the register was drawn up and the attention paid to certain exceptional circumstances; it is almost impossible to remedy. Every precaution must therefore be taken to ensure that such persons vote only once. Multiple voting by persons with several cards using different identities can be prevented only by an appropriate use of indelible ink at the time of voting. In this matter, the electoral authorities and also the party monitors and international observers will have to take special care to ensure that the ink

does not become mingled with products other than those from the official supplier or with supplies left over from previous elections, that only officially provided bottles are used and that voters are not allowed to depart from the voting site until they have received the ink mark.

III. THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

24. The electoral campaign opened officially on 20 November for the election of the President and on 20 January for the election of the Legislative Assembly. The electoral campaign for the municipal elections begins officially on 20 February. In practice, campaign activities started before the dates indicated and there is some discreet overlap between them. The political climate of the campaign is calm in institutional terms - relations between the contending parties, organization of public events, access to the media, content of publicity, and so forth - despite some incidents of political violence and intimidation and the persistence of high rates of common crimes and ordinary offences. ONUSAL teams have attended approximately 200 electoral events throughout El Salvador, in all the departments, without coming across any incidents of importance.

25. At the institutional level, campaign activities are proceeding without major incident, although the extent of compliance with the electoral norms can and must be improved in the time remaining before the elections. Under the auspices of ONUSAL and the Tribunal, the political parties have signed pacts of honour about the conduct of the campaign in 12 of the 14 departments of El Salvador, and similar pacts are under discussion in the remaining 2 departments. The parties hold joint meetings at regular intervals to discuss campaign developments. These meetings are sponsored by ONUSAL.

26. Generally speaking, the public part of the campaign and the display of posters, flags and wall paintings have proceeded smoothly, although there have been reports of incidents in which activists have destroyed or pasted over a political party's mural propaganda. Thus far, none of these incidents has been serious. All the parties are being granted access to the media, although the frequency of access and the extent of coverage depend on the medium concerned. As to the content of the publicity, the Electoral Division of ONUSAL has received a number of complaints regarding the use of public resources to promote indirectly the party of the Government in power. In addition, the Electoral Division itself, in monitoring the media, has noticed two pieces of televised publicity by the ARENA party containing elements that may violate article 18 of the electoral propaganda rules. That article provides that no party shall include in its publicity emblems and insignia used by other parties.

27. There are some incidents that are not at all conducive to an atmosphere of civil tranquillity and political freedom. First and foremost, there are the murders in recent months of at least 15 persons of some political importance, concerning which suspicions or allegations of political motivation have been expressed. Two former commanders and four ex-combatants of FMLN were murdered in the last week of October 1993. During November 1993, four ARENA activists (a councilman, a former mayor, the brother of a mayor and a grass-roots activist) and two FMLN activists were murdered, and an FMLN activist and an

ARENA activist were injured. In the first week of December, a former commander of FMLN and the brother of an FMLN candidate for mayor were murdered. In January 1994, a young MSN activist was murdered while painting political graffiti. During the same period, the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL received 46 reports of murders, initially described as summary executions, including the 15 murders already cited, whose perpetrators are not identified. In addition to these incidents of extreme violence, there have been public reports in the media describing approximately 15 acts of intimidation, attempted violence or threats against political persons or facilities; they relate mostly to FMLN and to a lesser extent to PDC and ARENA. The deep concern caused by the resurgence of violence in El Salvador was reflected in my letter to the President of the Security Council of 3 November 1993 (S/26689), his reply in a note of 5 November (S/26695), my report on ONUSAL of 23 November (S/26790) and Security Council resolution 888 (1993) of 30 November 1993. Although the murders alluded to are not fully elucidated in terms of police investigation or judicial outcome, they do have a direct political relevance in an electoral campaign and should be regarded as incidents with a political impact, even though assessing that impact would be highly problematical at this stage of the electoral process.

28. However, while the personal unhappiness and the social failure that are implicit in the loss of human life, bodily assaults and violations of personal safety are to be deplored, it is encouraging to note that the frequency of this type of incident has diminished during December and January, and that the Joint Group for the investigation of politically motivated illegal armed groups, which was established on the initiative of the United Nations, is already meeting and is discharging its mandate. Moreover, the aforementioned acts of violence and intimidation against political persons occurred outside the framework of the electoral campaign proper and of the dialogue, both institutional and informal, between the contending parties. Thus far, they do not seem to have affected in a relevant or visible way the relatively normal climate in which the electoral process is unfolding, particularly in the light of the country's recent emergence from a long internal conflict and the extremely harsh environment of crime, unemployment and lack of basic social services with which Salvadorians have to contend daily.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

29. The Salvadorian people have travelled a long and arduous path to reach the current stage in their quest for peace and national reconciliation. The elections on 20 March represent an opportunity to establish a new political framework that will include the forces formerly in opposition which refused to resolve their differences by means of civil discourse and dialogue between Government and opposition and between parliamentary majority and parliamentary minorities. Travelling this path could not have been without difficulties and risks. It is to the credit of the Salvadorian people and their leaders of all persuasions that they were able to overcome the obstacles through courage and political wisdom and to advance to the stage of holding elections. Further difficulties must be expected; it is to be hoped that they are few and of little importance. What is essential, however, is that the political leaders should not lose sight of the noble objectives set and should remain steadfast in

working towards those objectives, while the citizens must not find pretexts to lose their trust in the leaders or the feeling of security and political freedom. These are the circumstances that will enable the voters to cast an individual, free and secret ballot on 20 March and accept as valid the election result.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Items 100, 103 and 104 of
the preliminary list*
CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, QUESTIONS RELATING
TO REFUGEES, RETURNEES AND
DISPLACED PERSONS AND
HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 15 February 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Gabon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, the text of a communiqué from the Gabonese Government concerning the deaths of 67 illegal immigrants on 3 February 1994 in a barracks of the national gendarmerie in Libreville (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under items 100, 103 and 104 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Emmanuel MBA ALLO
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/49/50.

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ANNEX

Communiqué issued by the Government of Gabon on 4 February 1994

On Thursday, 3 February 1994, 67 illegal immigrants of various nationalities died in a barracks of the national gendarmerie in Libreville.

This tragedy, which shook the people and Government of Gabon, is due to the following phenomena:

(1) The extent of the migratory flow between the countries of the Gulf of Guinea and Gabon;

(2) The lack of facilities for accommodating immigrants before they are returned to the countries from which they came.

For Gabon, the tradition of African hospitality is not just a convenient slogan, and, until recently, Gabon welcomed the arrival on its soil of men and women from all continents:

18 January 1994	24 immigrants
27 January 1994	39 immigrants
28 January 1994	50 immigrants
1 February 1994	28 immigrants
2 February 1994	85 immigrants

This policy now conflicts with the demands of the country's current difficult economic situation.

In that context we have repeatedly pointed out to the authorities of the countries from which these immigrants come that the flow of people leaving their territory must be stemmed or regulated by means of an information campaign and by making them aware of the risks involved in illegal immigration.

The Gabonese Government should like to recall here the action it has embarked on in close collaboration with the countries from which these illegal immigrants come, in particular by exchanging special missions in order to work out the terms on which the immigrants will return.

It is in that context that many illegal immigrants from Nigeria and Mali have been able to return to their countries. To date, the international inquiry conducted by the Gabonese authorities has not yet determined the responsibilities of the various persons involved.

However, it is worth pointing out that individuals or groups of individuals play a leading role in the continuing flow of illegal immigrants into Gabon.

The considerable financial payments involved is what keeps this hateful traffic alive.

Accordingly, Gabon, anxious to preserve its ties with other African countries and the well-being of peoples, is requesting the assistance of friendly countries and international and non-governmental organizations in order to eradicate this scourge.

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S/1994/181
16 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARMENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a statement issued on 14 February 1994 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the statement as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alexander ARZOUMANIAN
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement dated 14 February 1994 issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia with regard to new developments in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia is deeply concerned with new and dangerous developments in the region as a result of Azerbaijan's new strategy to implement its old policy of imposing a military solution on the Nagorny Karabakh conflict.

In mid-December 1993, Azerbaijan launched a new large-scale offensive on Nagorny Karabakh which continues unabated. As a result of this new offensive, thousands of people have died, among them a large number of civilians, as Azerbaijanis bombard indiscriminately the civilian centres of Nagorny Karabakh and the border regions of the Republic of Armenia.

Consistent with its recent intransigent position with regard to peace efforts, Azerbaijan has rejected the most recent Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Minsk Group peace plan, to which both Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh responded positively, has refused to accept the effort of the Russian Federation to establish a cease-fire and has ignored the appeal of the Chairman of the International Olympic Committee for a temporary cease-fire during the Winter Olympic Games.

Furthermore, as part of the policy of seeking a military solution, Azerbaijan has been using delay tactics and, for the second time in two weeks, caused the postponement of the planned visit of the new Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Group to the region.

The Ministry is particularly concerned with Azerbaijan's continuing efforts to further escalate the conflict. During the past few months, Azerbaijan has successfully internationalized the Nagorny Karabakh conflict by involving non-Azerbaijani arms, mercenaries and advisors, and, more recently, has used third-country territories to launch attacks on the Republic of Armenia. On 11 February 1994, two Azerbaijani military aircraft used Iranian airspace to encroach on Armenia's southern region and drop several demolition bombs, causing destruction and casualties among the civilian population.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia expresses its disappointment regarding the failure of the United Nations, CSCE and the international community to condemn Azerbaijan's violation of relevant Security Council resolutions and international norms of behaviour.

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S/1994/182
16 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to my letters of 6 February 1994 (S/1994/131) and 11 February 1994 (S/1994/159) pertaining to the recent developments in Sarajevo following the shelling of a market-place on 5 February 1994.

Following the initial investigation of the incident a team was established by my Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia to conduct a comprehensive follow-up investigation. The team was led by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Force Engineer, Colonel Michel Gauthier of Canada, and included officers from France, Pakistan, Russia and Spain. The team also maintained close contact with Liaison Officers from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serbs.

The team has now submitted its report to my Special Representative. With regard to the question of the origin of the 120 mm mortar shell, the report's findings are as follows:

> "The distance of origin of fire clearly overlaps each side of the confrontation line by 2,000 metres. Both parties are known to have 120 mm mortars and bombs to go along with them. The Team has no reason to believe that either party does not have access to the type of ammunition reported in paragraph 12 of the report. There is insufficient physical evidence to prove that one party or the other fired the mortar bomb. The mortar bomb in question could, therefore, have been fired by either side."

I would appreciate it if you could bring this information to the attention of the members of the Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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S/1994/183
16 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

My Government is increasingly concerned about the implementation of Security Council resolutions 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993 and 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993 and the effectuation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ultimatum with respect to the control and/or withdrawal of Serbian heavy weaponry. We have agreed, as a gesture of good will, to withdraw or place under United Nations control our heavy weapons in Sarajevo, even though explicitly exempted from doing so under the terms of resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993). At the same time, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Serbians are being afforded a definition of "control" and "withdrawal" that is so permissive as to be inconsistent with the terms of the aforementioned resolutions, the NATO ultimatum and the cease-fire agreement signed at Sarajevo airport on 9 February 1994.

This permissive and invalid definition of resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993), combined with the interjection of United Nations forces along existing confrontation lines and with no further effort by the United Nations command in Bosnia to take control from Serbian forces of certain strategic placements, including key communications, transportation, water and electricity areas, may have the unwitting effect of solidifying the unacceptable status quo and institutionalizing the siege of Sarajevo with most of its negative humanitarian, military and political consequences. We believe that the international community would like to avoid these consequences, and we urge the Security Council to take note and ensure that resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) be effectively implemented and that the siege of Sarajevo be truly lifted.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-08129 (E) 160294

160294

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/184
16 February 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that at 1855 hours on 15 February 1994 United States and Coalition aircraft overflew the town of Samawah at various altitudes and broke the sound barrier over residential neighbourhoods, causing breakage of glass in the windows and doors of a large number of homes and government offices in the town and bringing alarm and panic to women, children and elderly persons.

That the aggressor aircraft of the United States and its Coalition partners thus continue to break the sound barrier provides further evidence that the United States of America is persisting in inflicting injury on Iraq and its people and in prejudicing the country's security and sovereignty.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq, protesting against these continued acts of aggression in the strongest possible terms, requests you to intervene and to take such steps as are required by the Charter of the United Nations to bring them to a halt and prevent their future recurrence.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-08336 (E) 180294 180294 210294

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/185
16 February 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 15 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, during the period from 1 to 10 February 1994, United States aircraft continued to violate Iraqi national airspace for the purpose of observation and provocation and in order to drop heat flares.

1 February 1994

(a) Northern region: 36 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 42 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Salman, Qal'at Salih, Jalibah, Artawi, Shatrah and Busayyah.

2 February 1994

(a) Northern region: 22 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Shaqlawah, Sinjar, Zakho, Amadiyah and Dukan.

(b) Southern region: 72 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Basra, Qurnah, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

3 February 1994

(a) Northern region: 14 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 48 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Basra, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Samawah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Jalibah, Busayyah and Artawi.

- At 1310 hours on 3 February 1994, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft violated Iraqi airspace, flying at a speed of 600 km/h and at

an altitude of 20,000 m over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah and Artawi. It departed at 1415 hours, heading in the direction of Saudi Arabia.

4 February 1994

(a) Northern region: 25 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Irbil, Dohuk, Amadiyah and Zakho.

(b) Southern region: 60 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Amarah, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah, Jalibah, Artawi and Busayyah.

5 February 1994

(a) Northern region: No hostile activity was recorded in the northern region on 5 February 1994.

(b) Southern region: 60 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Basra, Qurnah, Busayyah, Jalibah, Salman and Artawi.

6 February 1994

(a) Northern region: 36 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Amadiyah, Shaqlawah, Aqrah and Rawandoz.

(b) Southern region: 76 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Basra, Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Jabayish, Busayyah, Artawi, Jalibah and Salman.

- At 1203 hours on 6 February 1994, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft violated Iraqi airspace, flying at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 20,000 m over Nasiriyah, Amarah, Samawah, Qal'at Sukkar and Busayyah. It departed at 1440 hours, heading in the direction of Saudi Arabia.

7 February 1994

(a) Northern region: 32 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah and Tall Afar.

(b) Southern region: 68 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, the area south of Diwaniyah, Jalibah, Artawi and Busayyah.

- At 1444 hours on 7 February 1994, a hostile aircraft dropped three heat flares on the Ba'shiqah area in Ninawa Governorate.

8 February 1994

(a) Northern region: 37 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Irbil and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 56 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Basra, Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Amarah, Busayyah and Jalibah.

9 February 1994

(a) Northern region: 20 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Dukan.

(b) Southern region: 72 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Basra, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Samawah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Busayyah, Jalibah, Artawi and Salman.

- At 1032 hours on 9 February 1994, a hostile aircraft dropped a heat flare to the south of the Qush area in Ninawa Governorate.

- At 1231 hours on 9 February 1994, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft violated Iraqi airspace, flying at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 20,000 m over Nasiriyah, Amarah, Shatrah, Rifa'i, the area south of Najaf, Diwaniyah, Samawah, Shanafiyah and Rumaythah. It departed at 1500 hours, heading in the direction of Hafr al-Batin in Saudi Arabia.

10 February 1994

(a) Northern region: 35 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah, Aqrah and Tall Afar.

(b) Southern area: 46 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Qurnah, Artawi, Basra and Busayyah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/186
17 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to attach herewith the text of a press statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore on the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its attachment circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) CHEW Tai Soo
Permanent Representative

Annex

Press statement dated 12 February 1994 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Singapore Government welcomes the ultimatum issued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the Bosnian Serbs to cease all shelling of Sarajevo and withdraw or hand over their heavy weapons to United Nations forces. The immediate response of the Bosnian Serbs has been to call for a cease-fire around Sarajevo. But the Bosnian Serbs have established a cynical pattern of bending to international pressure and immediately reverting to their indiscriminate attacks when the threat of military action is lifted. The stakes in Bosnia are high for the international community. Failure effectively to implement this latest ultimatum will not only lead to more innocent lives lost in Bosnia. It could also send a wrong signal that the international community is now prepared to tolerate and accept aggression.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
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S/1994/186*
18 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to attach herewith the text of a press statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore on the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its attachment circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) CHEW Tai Soo
Permanent Representative

* Reissued for technical reasons.

Annex

Press statement dated 12 February 1994 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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UNITED
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S/1994/187
17 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LIBERIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the communiqué issued in Monrovia on 15 February 1994 at the conclusion of a meeting between the Liberian parties to the Cotonou Agreement of 25 July 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) William BULL
Permanent Representative

Annex

Communiqué issued on 15 February 1994 at the conclusion of the meeting of the Liberian parties in Monrovia

The Liberian parties to the Cotonou Agreement of 25 July 1993 met on Tuesday, 15 February 1994, in Monrovia. The meeting was facilitated by the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative for Liberia, Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers, and the Eminent Person of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), former President Canaan Banana. Also in attendance was a delegation from Benin representing President Soglo, current Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), led by Minister Theodore Holo; and the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) Field Commander, Major-General John Inienger.

The following representatives of the Liberian parties were present at the meeting:

For the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU)

Mr. Roosevelt G. Jayjay	Chairman of the delegation
Mr. Conmany B. Wesseh	Member
Mr. Abdoulaye Dukule	Member
Mr. Brownie J. Samukai, Jr.	Member
Colonel Thomas G. S. Doeway	Member

For the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL/NPRAG)

Mr. John T. Richardson	Chairman of the delegation
Mr. Laveli Supuwood	Member
Mr. Roland C. Massaquoi	Member
Mr. John Cummings	Member
Mr. Joe W. Mulbah	Member

For the United Liberation Government for Democracy in Liberia

Mr. Harry Nayou	Chairman of the delegation
Gen. Roosevelt Johnson	Member
Mr. D. L. Maxwell Kaba	Member
Mr. Isaac Bai Karlar	Member
Mr. Isaac Quawah	Member

The parties reached agreement with respect to the outstanding military and political issues.

Military

In accordance with article 21 of section K of the Cotonou Agreement, after the presentations by the ECOMOG Field Commander and the United Nations Chief Military Observer on the planned joint reconnaissance missions and the deployment concept and schedule for ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer

Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), the parties agreed to provide within 48 hours to ECOMOG and UNOMIL the following information required for the preparation of schedules of implementation for disarmament: (a) numbers and locations of combatants; (b) numbers of weapons, including artillery; (c) location of mines; (d) number of prisoners of war; and (e) designation of liaison officials. The parties also agreed to the schedule of the joint UNOMIL/ECOMOG reconnaissance missions in their respective areas.

Political

The parties reaffirmed that the Cotonou Agreement provides the best framework for durable peace in Liberia. In this connection, they reiterated their total commitment to the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. The parties accepted IGNU's nomination of Councillor Philip A. Z. Banks to replace Mr. Bismarck Kuyon on the Council of State. The parties also agreed that the Council of State should hold elections to select officers of the Council. IGNU informed the parties that it would appoint a replacement to fill the vacancy in the Elections Commission, created by the resignation of Mr. Patrick Seyon, Co-Chairman of the Commission and an IGNU appointee. ULIMO indicated that a second member would take up his position this week. With regard to the timetable for general elections, the parties agreed that free and fair elections would be held on 7 September 1994. Regarding the disposition of the Cabinet posts of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance and Defence, the parties agreed to continue their consultations with a view to resolving this issue, while awaiting advice from ECOWAS, OAU and the United Nations.

The ECOMOG Field Commander and the United Nations Chief Military Observer informed the parties that full deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL throughout Liberia would be completed by 7 March 1994 and that they would begin the lifting of arms from the combatants. The parties therefore agreed that the installation of the Liberian National Transitional Government would take place on 7 March 1994.

The parties stressed in particular their sincere appreciation for the efforts made by the current Chairman of ECOWAS, President Nicéphore Soglo; the ECOMOG Field Commander, Major-General John Inienger; the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Trevor Gordon-Somers; and the OAU Eminent Person, former President Canaan Banana, to ensure the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement and the full restoration of peace in Liberia.

DONE AT MONROVIA, 15 February 1994

SIGNED:

Mr. Roosevelt JAYJAY
IGNU

Mr. John T. RICHARDSON
NPFL/NPRAG

Mr. D. I. Maxwell KABA
FOR ULIMO

WITNESSED BY:

Hon. Theodore HOLO
ECOWAS

Prof. Canaan BANANA
OAU

Mr. Trevor GORDON-SOMERS
United Nations